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Conserving and Developing the Landt
BERNARD H. SIEGAN*
Land is a precious and scarce natural resource. It should be uti-
lized to best provide for the needs and desires of the people. This will
occur to the most optimum degree if the use and development of
land is left to the private marketplace except in those instances when
government has a vital and pressing need to impose regulation. The
great lesson of our times is that the forces of production, conserva-
tion, and creativity rest principally in the marketplace and not in
government. True, private entrepreneurs act largely in their own self
interest, but probably no more so than people in government, and
their endeavors in the economic area are much more oriented to the
general public welfare.'
This wisdom is now subscribed to by government leaders through-
out the world, including those in China, the Soviet Union, and other
eastern bloc countries.2 Leaders in the Marxist world have come to
t Copyright © 1990 Bernard H. Siegan.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This article is an ed-
ited version of the keynote address delivered by the author on February 28, 1989 at the
Fifth International Congress of Urbanism held in Porto Alegre, Brazil.
1. This view is consistent with the "public choice perspective" advanced by James
M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in Economics for 1986. He emphasizes self interest as the
motivating factor in both private and political choice. However, the forces of the econom-
ics marketplace are more likely to channel individual self interest into socially desirable
outcomes. See generally J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOG!-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); Buchanan, The Constitu-
lion of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 243 (1987).
2. See generally Z. BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF
COMMUNISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1989). Brzezinski served during the Carter
Administration as Assistant to the President, National Security Affairs, and as Director
of the National Security Council. "Prospering only where it abandons its internal sub-
stance even if still retaining some of its external labels, communism will be remembered
largely as the twentieth century's most extraordinary political and intellectual aberra-
tion." Id. at 1.
Indicative of the greater acceptance of capitalist theory, 50 countries during the last
10 years-including industrial countries-have significantly reduced their maximum
recognize that private ownership and enterprise offer their countries
relief from economic regression and stagnation. They understand
that collectivist systems have wasted and exploited their nations' re-
sources, and that their only hope for economic and social progress
rests with private enterprise and ownership. 3
Such philosophical conversions are understandable. By comparison
to the socialist world, capitalism's economic accomplishments have
been enormous. This point is well illustrated by the state of this
marginal tax rates on individual incomes. In the United States, this rate was 70% in
1979, and 28% in 1989. A. Reynolds, International Comparisons of Taxes and Govern-
ment Spending (presented at conference on "Rating Economic Freedom," Banff, Al-
berta, Oct. 5-8, 1989).
3. See generally Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2. Recent media stories indicate the
Soviet economy will allow for greater private ownership and enterprise.
On August 11, 1988 Pravda reported, "Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Politburo member
then responsible for Marxist-Leninist doctrine, proclaim[ed] that nowadays 'the ideology
of the owner must be paramount,' adding that 'instilling a sense of ownership was a good
thing, for when a worker has a stake in something, a person will move mountains; if he
does not, he will be indifferent.'" Id. at 11.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Siberia, stated that "only by opening
more private businesses could the country generate the competition that will ultimately
bring down prices." Siberians Scold Gorbachev for Empty Stores, Lines, San Diego
Union, Sept. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 4, at A9, col. 1.
In April 1988, a new law was published in Soviet newspapers allowing Soviet citizens
to lease land, animals, equipment, or even entire factories for 50 years or more, sublease
it to others, and pass it on to their children when they die. Extensive Soviet Land Rights
Listed, San Diego Union, Apr. 10, 1989, at A2, col. 5. In early 1990, the Communist
Party platform embraced the principle of private property. Soviet Communists Accept
Notion of Private Property, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1990, at A19, col. 3.
Professor Paul Craig Roberts quotes Abel Aganbegyan, chief economic advisor to
Mikhail Gorbachev as stating, "We are going to establish private property in the means
of production." Roberts, Supply-Side Theory is Alive and Well-In Moscow, Bus, WK.,
July 24, 1989, at 10.
In Poland in 1989, the government owned 98.4% of the country's productive assets In
industry, and a major concern of the Polish government in spring of that year was how to
privatize them. Filar, Poland on a Rough Road Toward Economic Pluralism, Wall St.
J., Mar. 13, 1989, at A15, col. 3.
4. See generally Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2; J. SHELTON, THE COIiNG SOVIET
CRASH 3-100 (1989). Some perceptive observers explain that communism has eliminated
the booms and busts of capitalism by eliminating the booms.
According to Brzezinski, in recent years, research and academic economists supporting
Gorbachev urged a "truly comprehensive dismantling of the centralized planning appara-
tus. . . . Central planning, they argued, had to be replaced with a modified market
mechanism." Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 67. For some interesting insights into the
operation of the Soviet economic system, see Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's recent
book M. GORBACHEV, TOWARD A BETTER WORLD 251-302 (1987). Specifically, note his
criticisms of central planning, id. at 279-85, and his conclusion that a "serious restruc-
turing is required in planning work." Id. at 284.
Leon Aron, who formerly lived in the Soviet Union, writes in Commentary that since
Glasnost, reports within the Soviet Union have been candid about its economic problems.
With the official poverty level set at 75 rubles per person per month, it has been reported
that 43 million are under the poverty line, and 40% of Soviet families, about 100 million
people, live on less than 100 rubles a month. The consumption of meat and dairy prod-
ucts by the Soviet "poor" has declined by 30% since 1970. A total of 1.2 million beds
are in hospitals with no hot water; every sixth bed is in a hospital with no running water
at all; 30% of Soviet hospitals do not have indoor toilets. Half the nation's elementary
[VOL. 27: 279. 1990] Conserving and Developing the Land
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
nation's economy in recent years. Notwithstanding the minimal
amount of price controls in the United States, prices rose annually
during the seven years including and prior to 1988 only an average
of about 3.6%, the biggest increase occurring in 1988 in the amount
of 4.4% and the lowest in 1986 at 1.1 %.1 Moreover, during this
period the economy was strong, registering a record length of pros-
perity. It grew at an average annual rate of about three percent, and
unemployment decreased from 9.5 % to an historically low rate of
5.4 % .6 This impressive record is in large measure attributable to the
high level of production that existed during this period.
To be sure, communism's failures do not mean that every control
over private enterprise or property will be unsuccessful. However,
the magnitude and breadth of that system's failures should en-
courage careful inquiry into the costs and benefits of limitations on
private economic activity. At the very least, it would seem this na-
tion should be wary of utilizing economic restraints that have not
worked in the communist countries. Thus, one major failing of the
communist system has been master planning. On a micro level,
master planning is an essential part of zoning regulation. Under zon-
ing, the use of all property in a locality is restricted pursuant to a
master plan. The major trouble in zoning-as elsewhere-is that the
schools lack central heating, running water, or sewage systems. Aron, What Glasnost
Has Destroyed, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1989, at 30-31.
In 1983, there was one car for every 1.8 Americans, 4.4 Japanese, 2.5 Germans, and
2.8 Italians, but one for every 14.2 Soviets, 5.8 Czechs, and 10.8 Poles. "It is a-startling
fact that blacks own more cars per capita in South Africa than do citizens in the Soviet
Union." Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 238. In October 1989, it was reported that
Soviet consumers were suffering some of the worst shortages of food and other goods the
country had ever known. With the approach of winter, complaints "ha[d] grown to an
angry chorus." Soviet is upset by food, San Diego Union, Oct. 16, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
Initiated in 1978, the progressive decollectivization of Chinese agricultural land "had
prompted a dramatic surge in productivity .... China was transformed from a net im-
porter of food to an actual exporter." Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 2, at 165. "This agricul-
tural rebirth stimulated growth in the output of Chinese rural industry, which increased
by a staggering 400% between 1981 and 1986 and which grew by a further 36% in
1987 alone." Id. at 166.
5. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS 24 (Dec. 1989).
The foregoing figures do not take into account the improvement in quality that occurs
over time. Were quality improvement considered, the price increases would be, in my
opinion, significantly less than those set forth. Thus, it has been suggested that a two
percent per year increase in the official price index would be the equivalent of stable
prices. An Interview with Milton Friedman, FRASER FORUM, July 1989, at 7. I used
these statistics in comparing the two economic systems in part because the speech was
delivered in Brazil which has long experienced high inflation despite numerous regulatory
efforts to cabin prices and wages.
6. EcoN. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 294, 301 (Feb. 1990); COUNCIL OF ECON. AD-
VISERS, supra note 5, at 12.
plan limits production arbitrarily with adverse effects on supply,
prices, and competition.
Eliminating master planning is a theme common to the recom-
mendations for reform of land use regulation proposed by President
Reagan's Commission on Housing. The President appointed this
thirty-member commission in 1981 to seek ways to increase the sup-
ply of housing and lower its cost. The Commission's report, 7 issued
in 1982, urged severe limitations on zoning and other land use regu-
lations in order to accomplish these purposes. It urged that munici-
palities retain only such powers over the development of private
housing as are necessary to preserve vital and pressing governmental
interests.
The report contains over 100 recommendations covering all as-
pects of housing. The proposals on land use present a message com-
mon to many others endorsed in the report: to obtain more housing
at lower cost, remove most government controls. The Commission
recommended that a "vital and pressing" standard be applied to de-
termine the need for regulation. According to the report, market
forces should determine the location and composition of new devel-
opment-type, size of unit, density, land coverage, and
height-unless the municipality could prove that it had, in effect, an
extremely persuasive justification-a vital and pressing one-for ap-
plying restraint. The objective is to forbid imposition of regulations
that curtail housing development and that do not in fact implement
police powers.
Similar to the determinations made by presidential commissions
appointed by prior administrations, 8 Reagan's found great wrongs
and abuses at the local level, but, unlike the prior studies, proposed
deregulation. Regulation, this commission concluded, was the prob-
lem, not the solution. Deregulation would not only remove the
wrongs and abuses, but would better serve the public interest.9
Some local controls relating to use and development should con-
tinue. Only municipalities are able to plan and build streets, parks,
public buildings, schools, storm and sanitary sewers, and water
mains. Municipalities must also secure the public's vital and pressing
interests, which the Commission identified broadly as limited to pro-
7. REP. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous. (1982) [hereinafter REPORT]. The recom-
mendations on regulations are contained in Section IV, beginning on page 177. The au-
thor of this article was a member of the Commission, serving as Chairman of the Regu-
lations Committee.
8. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN Hous., A DECENT HOME (1969); NAT'L
COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONG. AND TO THE PRES., BUILDING THE AMERI-
CAN CITY (1968). "In short, although the basic justification for zoning is to protect the
overall public good, this often appears to be the last consideration as zoning is now prac-
ticed." Id. at 20.
9. REPORT, supra note 7, at 177-82.
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tecting health and safety, remedying unique environmental
problems, preserving historical resources, and protecting investments
in existing public infrastructure resources. 10 More specifically, "vital
and pressing governmental interest" includes requiring adequate san-
itary sewer and water services and flood protection; assuring that
topographic conditions will permit safe construction and accommo-
date septic tank effluents; protecting drinking water aquifers; avoid-
ing nuisance or obnoxious uses; requiring off-street parking; prohibit-
ing residential construction amid industrial development; and
avoiding long-term damage to the vitality of historically established
neighborhoods."
Accordingly, government controls would be limited to forbidding
private activity that is truly harmful, much as is the case when other
private actions such as speech, press, religion, mobility, or privacy
are restricted. 2 This is the proper role of government: to protect the
public from harm, and not to prohibit or diminish production, com-
petition, and creativity.
Residents often complain when new development increases traffic
and pollution of air and water, and when it decreases open space.
They object that growth brings more crime and taxes. Although
comfort and convenience levels may be reduced for some as a result
of growth, it is difficult to conclude that existing residents have been
injured in a legal sense. In our society, states and municipalities are
part of a political union and not walled enclaves serving solely their
own interests. They are expected to develop and grow to serve the
diverse demands of the population. To exclude people and limit de-
velopment to a level that is not consistent with these ordinary expec-
tations would unfairly grant certain residents special benefits. As a
New York judge observed many years ago, one who chooses
to live in the large centers of population cannot expect the quiet of the
10. Id. at 200, 1
11. The Commission's recommendations apply only to the development of housing.
The vital and pressing standard is set forth as follows:
To protect property rights and to increase the production of housing and lower
its cost, all State and local legislatures should enact legislation providing that
no zoning regulations denying or limiting the development of housing should be
deemed valid unless their existence or adoption is necessary to achieve a vital
and pressing governmental interest. In litigation, the governmental body seek-
ing to maintain or impose the regulation should bear the burden for proving it
complies with the foregoing standard.
Id. The commission adopted this recommendation without any dissent.
12. The Commission suggested an elevation in the level of judicial scrutiny applied
in land use decisions to provide greater judicial protection for rights of ownership. Id. at
202 n.13.
country. Congested centers are seldom free from smoke, odors, and other
pollution from houses, shops, and factories, and one who moves into such a
region cannot hope to find the pure air of the village or outlying district. A
person who prefers the advantages of community life must expect to experi-
ence some of the resulting inconveniences. 13
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the matter as one of in-
dividual liberty:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the
natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped
areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not. A
zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new-
comers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the
administration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid.' 4
Erecting barriers to travel and occupancy interferes with a free soci-
ety's ideals of mobility and opportunity. Absent a vital and pressing
justification, growth control lacks equitable or philosophical roots in
a legal system essentially dedicated to maximizing liberty.
Actually, as previously stated, the vital and pressing standard does
allow a community to limit development in order to remedy "unique
environmental problems." The burden would be on the community to
prove that conditions have reached an unusually adverse level de-
manding application of growth restrictions. In addition, the commu-
nity must show that the primary purpose of the regulation is to ame-
liorate this problem and not to exclude people since, as the Reagan
Commission concluded, "exclusion is clearly not an acceptable gov-
ernmental interest.
15
Some reject growth on a utilitarian basis: it does not pay its way,
and therefore raises taxes. Many studies have been conducted to de-
termine the costs and benefits of new development, and the results
13. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 40, 58 N.Y.S. 229, 232
(1932).
14. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). The right involved has been identified by one fed-
eral judge as the right to travel. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F.
Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), the United States Supreme Court
struck down a California statute which made criminal the bringing of nonresident indi-
gents into the state. In support of this law, California argued that the influx of migrants
had resulted in staggering problems of health, morals, and especially finance. However,
the Court held the law violated the right of travel protected under the commerce clause
of the Constitution; no "state [may] isolate itself from the difficulties common to all of
them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across borders." See id. at
173. The Court noted that indigent nonresidents were deprived of the opportunity to
exert political pressure on California lawmakers in order to obtain a change in policy. Id.
at 174. The same also occurs in growth control situations.
State laws that deny newly arrived indigents welfare benefits during the first year in
the state inhibit their exercise of the right to travel, and are therefore unconstitutional,
according to Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Growth controls operate simi-
larly, and thus may fail similar constitutional examination.
15. REPORT, supra note 7, at 200.
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are mixed. The problem with such studies is they are necessarily in-
complete and misleading-they are unable to quantify many advan-
tages localities obtain from new residents. For example, how does
one evaluate the gain to the elderly from the arrival of a cancer or
heart specialist or nurses to staff the local hospital, all of whom
might be excluded by growth controls or by the increased cost of
housing such controls cause? Similar advantages are reaped from
other professionals or technicians who might also be excluded.
Larger cities boast of cultural, educational, religious, library, medi-
cal, shopping, and transportation facilities not available in smaller
cities. Growth controls can also be costly when they cause unemploy-
ment or reduce the incomes of those who depend for their livelihoods
directly or indirectly on the construction industry, one of the nation's
major industries.
Some demand that in addition to paying for the direct costs con-
nected with it, new developments should also pay for all the indirect
costs, such as for the added use of roads, highways, sewer and water
facilities, schools, libraries, and so on. However, these facilities are
the property of the community and all its residents, new and old.
Congested roads may become more congested with the arrival of
newcomers, but the problem is not solely attributable to them: it is
the result of the development of the entire community. If the com-
munity had not developed so extensively, the newcomers' impact
would not be significant.
Once a person becomes a resident of a city, he or she is entitled to
all the benefits and burdens of residency-the use of facilities as well
as the responsibility of paying for these facilities. If their homes are
specially assessed (either before or after they purchase them), new
residents would be paying, in effect, an entry fee, which they would
again have to pay in taxes as residents. They would be subject to
double taxation.
Deregulation of zoning may augment tax receipts. By limiting
zoning restrictions, cities and towns will be encouraging the location
of developments that are highly profitable for the tax base, such as
factories, shopping centers, and high-rises, all of which yield sub-
stantial tax revenues and cost relatively little to service. The plants
and centers result in no children and the high-rises result in rela-
tively few children, and schools are by far the most expensive of mu-
nicipal services, typically accounting for two-thirds to three-fourths
of real estate tax bills.
By limiting growth, towns and cities also limit the number of po-
tential shoppers, consequently deterring the construction of shopping
centers. Housing limitations may likewise exclude workers for indus-
try, and thereby prevent location of that revenue source in the area.
I. PLANNING
Any critique of land use regulation should begin with a discussion
of land use planning. There is obviously much appeal in the notion
that we must have more and better planning. Do not individuals and
corporations carefully plan their activities and outlays? Why then
should government not be allowed or required to engage in this self-
same activity? The simple, yet highly profound answer is that public
land use planning is doomed to failure in a representative society.
Public land use planning means or implies an orderly, rational ar-
rangement of land uses directed by experts in planning. Although
this definition raises many questions, it seems to represent what most
people think of when they speak or write of planning. The assump-
tion seems to be that there is something precise, measurable, or
quantitative about planning, or its standards.
This assumption is exceedingly difficult to substantiate, and few of
even its most ardent proponents make the effort. Is there some pre-
cise measurement available to determine the "best" use of some or
all of the land, of growth and antigrowth proposals, and whether the
land is better suited for trees, industry, or the housing of people?
Should the land be developed with two, eight, or twelve housing
units to the acre, or is it better suited for a mobile home park or
shopping center, or should it be retained as open space?
By now, after seventy years of zoning experience in the United
States, it should be clear there are respectable, distinguished, and
knowledgeable planners who would disagree in many if not most in-
stances to any or all of these alternatives. Planning is unquestionably
highly subjective, lacking those standards and measurements that
are requisites of a scientific discipline.16
16. This writer once practiced law in Illinois. In every major zoning case in which
the writer was involved or had knowledge of, each side of the controversy was able to
hire a professional planner to testify in support of its position. Some of the cases were
basically verbal duels between planners with opposing views. For further discussion about
land use planning, see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 4-9 (1972); C. HAAR &
M. WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING 45-87 (4th ed. 1989).
Plans, of course, may reflect a particular ideology such as rejection of any marketplace
solutions to urban problems. Consider the following:
Program for Downtown Recovery.
1. Freeze downtown highrise development. There is no need for any new
highrise structures.
2. Selectively dismantle whole buildings and parts of buildings; save materials
for reuse.
3. Close off streets for orchards, vegetable gardens, parks, market places,
Close the city center to private automobiles. Buses and other service transit
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Planners confront serious problems in evaluating the present and
forecasting the future, whether it be on a micro or macro level. With
respect to zoning, overruling market based decisions on land use
would seem to require adherence to special goals or values, or per-
haps understandings that relatively few possess. Zoning experience is
replete with instances where planners classified land either to allow
uses unacceptable in the market or to deny uses eagerly sought in
the market. Theory and education alone cannot substitute for the
actual experience of making practical decisions and suffering their
consequences. Few planners have ever been part of the construction
or development industry, nor have they been responsible for decisions
on the location and development of residential, commercial, or indus-
trial projects. Even if they once had been, their information about
prices, materials, innovations, trends, and consumer desires and pref-
erences must now necessarily come from secondary or more remote
sources, not directly from the "firing line."
How then, can planners possibly be as familiar with the location,
development, construction, and operation of shopping centers, hous-
ing developments, nursing homes, or mobile parks as those who de-
velop, own, and operate them? Owners and their mortgage lenders
risk substantial funds on their success. Master planning will inevita-
bly forbid developers to build where they want, and will permit them
to build where they do not want.
However, regardless of their knowledge or ability, planners are not
destined to make a significant impact on the regulation of land use.
The major decisions will be adopted by the elected office holders who
possess the final authority. They can be expected to and will respond
to a variety of pressures and concerns, a principal one being the in-
terests of those who help them obtain and keep public office,.
Politics, rather than planning, will be largely involved. In short,
zoning and other land use regulations are, and have to be, tools more
of politics than of planning. Consider these limitations on the power
of the planner. First, he is a paid employee and cannot be expected
to espouse, with any degree of consistency, policies contrary to those
of his employers. The basic rules are established by those elected to
only.
4. Rebuild southern exposures for hydroponic gardens.
5. Renovate office space for multiple use-housing, community marketing,
meeting places, schools and other much needed things for the surrounding com-
munities. Diversify and decentralize downtown.
Berkeley, People's Architecture: The Recovery of Cities, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL
HANDBOOK 234, 238-39 (1970).
govern.
Secondly, even if a proposed plan appears in accord with the gen-
eral desires of the lawmakers or administrators, and its preparation
may actually have been commissioned by them, there will still have
to be public hearings and debates before it can be adopted. Amend-
ments required for passage can easily change the meaning and im-
pact of the proposed legislation. In practice, the "perfect" plan
stands little chance of remaining intact against the opposition of a
group of voters or politicians, pressures exerted by political support-
ers or contributors, payment of graft, or perhaps even the voice of
the local newspaper."
Accordingly, the "perfect" plan is likely to be quite imperfect by
the time it emerges from the legislative process, whether it be on a
local or higher governmental level, and it might be ravaged still
more as administered. And it is possible the courts may ultimately
lay some or much of it to rest.'8
Nor is the plan or law that is finally passed likely to remain intact
very long. From the moment of adoption, special interest groups such
as environmentalists, developers, and civic organizations will seek to
change it to their own benefit. A plan will never have enough open
space for the many environmentalists hostile to development. Nor
will those who can reap huge profits by avoiding the regulations sit
idly by. They will make every conceivable effort to rezone the classi-
17. In the San Diego area, persons seeking election to the County Board of Super-
visors or to the City Council frequently take positions on land use issues. Those elected to
office who have adopted a particular view are likely to be immune to persuasion from
another side, regardless of the evidence submitted in the hearings or the recommendation
of the planners. See Siegan, Land Use Planning in America: Controlling Other People's
Property Through Covenants, Zoning, State and Federal Regulations, 14 ENVTL, L.
385, 404-05 (1975). Planning is no less difficult in other economic areas. See INST. FOR
CONTEMP. STUDIES, THE POLITICS OF PLANNING: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF CEN-
TRALIZED ECONOMIC PLANNING (1976). For different opinions on the urban planning
process, see C. HAAR & M. WOLF, supra note 16, at 730-44.
18. Two recent United States Supreme Court cases have seriously limited zoning
options. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987), makes some losses incurred as a result of zoning regulation compensa-
ble; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), applies a substantial
means-ends test to determine zoning validity. The Court has also ruled in recent years
that a land use regulation can effect a taking if it denies an owner economically viable
use of his land. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
Over the years, state courts have struck down zoning ordinances considered as exclu-
sionary of lower-cost housing. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1974); Urban
League v. Mayor of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (1976), cert. denied, 74
N.J. 262, 377 A.2d 667 (1977), rev'd, 170 N.J. Super. 461, 406 A.2d 1322 (1979), rev'd
sub nom. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (1983); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
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fication on their properties or on those they would like to buy. They
will attempt to increase the number of units per acre or change the
category to one that is more valuable. Civic groups, likewise, will
sooner or later find the plan wanting in some or many respects.
Many of these pressures are bound to succeed, and that "perfect"
plan will in time be little more than history. The changes will be
made on a piecemeal basis, guided principally by political rather
than planning considerations. Consequently, the control of land use
and development through public planning and regulation is fre-
quently akin to performing surgery by a team consisting of faith
healers, exorcists, and surgeons. While the patient may not die in-
stantly, he may well wish he had.
II. POLITICS
The conventional wisdom at city halls across the United States is
that urban growth must be planned and controlled by the govern-
ment. The overwhelming majority of municipalities have adopted
zoning. City officials often profess that zoning generally is in every-
one's best interests and the planning commissioners and city council
members are acting for the "overall good" and "general welfare."
The question arises: Why are politicians or political appointees com-
petent to understand and motivated to implement the "public inter-
est?" What reason is there to believe that, unlike most people, public
office holders will make decisions inconsistent with their own inter-
ests? Can they possibly ignore their own personal welfare in the
judgments they make?
Politicians cater to those who put and keep them in office. This
may be in the tradition of representative society, but it warns us of
the hazards when economics are involved. Politicians are a conduit
for public whims and passions. That is a basic reason why we limit
their powers over speech, press, religion, and in criminal proceedings.
Should we not apply the same perspective whenever any individual
rights are at stake?
Studies show that the most important factor in zoning controver-
sies is the extent of the opposition to the proposed use. The larger
the crowd at the public hearings, the greater the likelihood that its
demands will prevail. 19 A big enough gathering of protesters appar-
19. Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1961-62); Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Phila-
delphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516 (1955).
ently may even overcome graft and political contributions. What
-conceivable relationship is there between crowds on one hand, and
individual rights and wise development on the other hand?
There is also the matter of competency. Zoning has given enor-
mous powers to local politicians, who frequently have minimal or no
qualifications for the trust. While there are notable exceptions, the
city council or zoning board is not likely to attract many individuals
with any special knowledge or technical competence in land use
planning and development.20 It is rare to find that persons holding
these jobs have had practical experience in these fields. As a result,
enormous powers are vested in persons to decide matters that they
could not possibly be hired to handle in private industry. 21
Obviously there should be great concern that land is not wasted. It
is one of our most precious resources. This is why we should prefer
the controls of the private rather than the political marketplace. The
political process that governs zoning encourages expediency and in-
competency. 22 By contrast, builders and developers, like all entrepre-
neurs, have to be reasonably expert at their business. They have to
use the land efficiently and effectively to survive financially. They
and their lenders, who also have significant stakes in the success of a
project, must plan and develop every parcel to provide maximum
utilization and minimum spoilage. Although of course they do go
astray, they surely are not motivated to reach the level of the politi-
cal process where the verdict of the crowd may be most decisive.
III. ENVIRONMENT
It is often maintained that the environment will suffer in the ab-
sence of zoning. 23 However, it would seem that environmental
20. Zoning is, of course, one of many issues which local politicians have to address.
It is a matter of chance whether someone with special knowledge in the field will be
elected to office.
21. Local elected officials are responsible to their own constituencies, and not to
persons living beyond the municipality's borders. Yet, land use decisions impact nonresi-
dents such as prospective home buyers. By contrast, developers and builders must be
concerned with satisfying potential purchasers, regardless of where these purchasers live.
22. The objective of efficiency-defined as that allocation of resources in which
value is maximized-is uppermost in the private market, for it is related to profits. By
contrast, for the legislative process, efficiency is usually not a primary concern, and quite
frequently may have little, if any, significance. Politicians do not gain much by promot-
ing efficiency. Yet, a traditional theory of zoning is that it removes barriers to the effi-
cient operation of the market. On the general subject of political and economic decision
making, see M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 9-69 (1979); F. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 340-75 (1972); H. JOHNSON, ON ECONOMICS AND SOCI-
ETY 3-60 (1975).
23. Opponents of a development quite often argue that it will cause congestion and
pollution and will reduce open space. From this perspective, all development is adverse to
the environment. Housing consumers should insist, however, that construction is benefi-
cial and essential to their environment.
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problems would be better resolved if addressed specifically, and not
as part of a system intended to serve a host of other purposes. The
market itself is not oblivious to environmental concerns. The greater
the level of competition, the more a developer will seek to lure con-
sumers with appearance, design, open space, landscaping, and recre-
ational facilities.
Nor has zoning shown itself to be a friend of the environment.
Consider, for example, two kinds of zoning regulations that are fre-
quently imposed in the name of environmentalism but which actually
harm it: first, those that reduce the amount of living units, single
family or multiple family, that will be allowed on an acre of land;
and second, those that prohibit high-rise or low-rise multiple family
construction. To require one house on two acres of land when the
potential occupants would be satisfied with a fraction of that amount
constitutes a waste of the land and their money. Similar reasoning
applies to limitations on multifamily buildings (apartments, condo-
miniums, and townhouses) or the prohibition entirely of these struc-
tures. (Each floor of an apartment building in effect adds to the sup-
ply of land.) There is no surer means for consuming needlessly the
land than by forcing persons who prefer to live in apartments or
townhouses to live in houses. 4 Frequently, sites for houses for the
same number of families will occupy five or even ten times as much
land as low-rise apartments do, and the figure is much higher with
respect to high-rises.
Needlessly consuming the land obviously limits the supply of that
resource.25 Moreover, prohibiting or limiting development will injure
the portion of the environment that is unquestionably the most im-
portant: that which houses the people and supplies their material
needs. 6
24. For example, in early 1989, the New York Department of City Planning pre-
pared a revision of the city's zoning ordinance that would reduce density by 10% to 30%
in the districts zoned R-3, R-4, and R-5. These districts accounted for 60% of all hous-
ing completions in Queens, Brooklyn, Bronx, and Staten Island boroughs in 1987. Chang-
ing the Rules for Attached Housing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1989, at R9, col. 2.
25. See B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979). The au-
thor discusses three proposals to develop major housing projects in Northern California
opposed by, among others, environmental groups. Originally intended to provide over
25,000 units, the developers could only obtain permission to erect about 3500. Even an
environmentally enhanced development was sacrificed in favor of permitting only very
low density, upper middle-class housing. Unit prices in the new developments were much
higher than those originally contemplated, largely due to the requirements imposed by
governmental authorities.
26. For most people, the home is where the major part of life is spent. Its charac-
teristics greatly influence the quality of one's life. Accordingly, the home should be a
One direct consequence of these antidevelopment policies will be
to deny those who would occupy the new and excluded housing an
opportunity to better their environment. Another consequence is that
the many people dependent on the construction and related indus-
tries for their livelihoods will see their living standards suffer tempo-
rarily if not permanently by the resultant curbs on production.27
The indirect effects of antidevelopment policies will be considera-
bly more pervasive. Environmental conditions throughout the af-
fected housing market will suffer. These policies will (1) curtail the
filtering process upon which great numbers of people are dependent
for better housing conditions, (2) generally raise the cost of shelter,(3) cause worse environmental conditions for many or most apart-
ment dwellers within that housing market, and (4) cause greater
spreading and scattering of housing accommodations, something
popularly condemned as "urban sprawl."
Filtering in housing occurs when new homes and apartments are
constructed and families move into them, vacating their former resi-
dences for occupancy by others. The others, in turn, may vacate still
other units and the process continues through a number of se-
quences. A study of this process in seventeen metropolitan areas
made in the middle 1960s by the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan has shown that on the average, the construc-
tion of one new unit makes it possible for a succession of 3.5 moves
to occur to different, and more likely better, housing accommoda-
tions.2 8 New construction thus benefits more people indirectly than it
does directly-2.5 moves to existing housing and only one move to
new housing.
The survey shows that for every 1000 new housing units built
there are over 3500 relocations. Of these 3500, an average of 333 are
by families defined as poor, and 933 are by moderate income fami-
lies.29 Thus, more than one-third of all those who move are likely to
be in the lower and moderate income categories. While most con-
major concern for all environmental regulation.
27. According to Herb Cawthorne, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Urban League of San Diego, a proposed limited growth initiative then before the voters
would have brought "havoc to the working class people of San Diego." No-Growth Ra-
cism Is An Abuse, San Diego Union, Aug. 26, 1988, at B11, col. 1. Bayard Rustin, long
a leader in civil rights causes, observed that liberal oriented environmentalists "have
failed to consider the implications of their creed that while a no-growth economy may
protect the fields and streams (which in itself is a dubious claim), it will most certainly
result in untold misery for thousands of ordinary people, many of whom are the black
poor of America and the poverty-stricken masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America."
Rustin, No-Growth and the Poor, San Diego Evening Tribune, July 31, 1975, at B3, col.
1.
28. J. LANSING, C. CLIFTON & J. MORGAN, NEw HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE: A
STUDY OF CHAINS OF MOVES (1969).
29. Id. at 41, 68.
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struction occurs in the outer portions of the metropolitan area, these
moves extend to older areas near the center of the city.30 The na-
tion's worst environmental conditions exist in these areas, and condi-
tions will further deteriorate if filtering is reduced. In the United
States, the housing subsidy programs have not done much to allevi-
ate these problems, and improvement necessitates greater housing
supply in the private market. For the government to elevate the liv-
ing standards of just 1000 families would require enormous
expenditures. 31
Those of higher income who are ineligible for subsidized housing
and who cannot afford new housing are similarly dependent for bet-
ter housing on the filtering process induced by new construction. The
University of Michigan survey makes it clear that prohibiting new
construction seriously harms the groups that are in need of a better
housing environment.
When government curtails construction in a housing market,
prices will increase and competition will decrease. 2 In the case of
apartments, vacancies will decrease. Rents will be raised either di-
rectly, through the amount actually charged, or indirectly, through
reduction in services, repairs, maintenance, and improvements, or
probably in many instances, through a combination of all or most of
these.3 3 Higher rents will cause more doubling-up, thereby increasing
30. Id. at 19, 20.
31. I am told by builders that in 1989, the cost of construction of a 1000 square
foot moderately equipped apartment in San Diego was about $50,000. Accordingly, con-
struction of 1000 new units would cost $50 million, plus land, which could be priced at
$20,000 to $40,000 per unit in low and moderate income areas.
Some localities have sought to provide lower cost housing by requiring developers to
set aside portions of their developments (from 10% to 20%) for this purpose. Among
other things, such requirements erode development feasibility, thereby limiting produc-
tion of housing. For an analysis of such zoning restrictions-usually referred to as "inclu-
sionary zoning"-see Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, in RESOLVING THE
HOUSING CRISIS: GOVERNMENT POLICY DECONTROL, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 135 (B.
Johnson ed. 1982) [hereinafter RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS].
32. See discussion of economic impact of the rules promulgated by California
Coastal Commission which controls development along California's coast. Frech, The
California Coastal Commissions: Economic Impacts, in RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRI-
SIS, supra note 31, at 259. For an interesting socioeconomic analysis of growth controls,
see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
In this case, a federal judge found that Petaluma, California's growth controls would
lead to a smaller housing supply and increased prices in its region.
33. Increases in rental costs will also increase pressure on government to adopt
rent controls, another regulation that limits production of housing, and therefore raises
its price. See FRASER INSTITUTE, RENT CONTROL: A POPULAR PARADOX (Vancouver,
B.C., 1975).
density within areas containing these buildings. These conditions will
be intensified as the filtering process is halted or reduced. The end
result will be much poorer housing conditions for a great many peo-
ple, and further deterioration for marginal and older buildings and
areas. Buildings that otherwise would be removed will remain in ser-
vice.34 More people will be paying more for the same or lesser qual-
ity housing.
Although the antidevelopment pressures will curtail much con-
struction, they cannot stop it all. The demand for new housing will
remain largely unabated, and it will be forced to locate in the places
of least resistance, where opposing political pressures are absent or
limited.35 The most likely areas for this to occur will be those of
small population, principally the more rural and outlying sections,
areas that otherwise would not be in demand. The result will be a
greater proliferation or scattering of housing and all of the problems
and detriments that come with "urban sprawl." These include the
cost of installing new or extending existing sewer and water facili-
ties, and building new or wider roads and highways. More telephone
poles and utility lines and generating stations will have to be in-
stalled. The cost of school bus transportation will increase. More
people will be spending greater amounts of time driving to and from
work and shopping. And much open space and green and wooded
areas will be disturbed or destroyed by this intrusion of housing and
related facilities. Land that should be used for farming will be con-
verted to urban development.36
Similarly, severe density restrictions will cause housing to spread
out, also necessitating the installation of more streets and other facil-
ities, and creating greater burdens and inconveniences for more peo-
ple. Obviously a two acre minimum lot size will generally require the
installation of more lineal feet of road than a one acre restriction.
An apartment or townhouse project containing many more times the
number of residents will require only a fraction of the lineal footage
of pavement needed for a single family development.
34. Opposition to zoning changes allowing construction of new apartment buildings
may, at times, come from existing apartment owners who fear the influx of new competi-
tion. Quite often, businessmen seek government regulation to achieve personal advantage.
35. As a general matter, developers have much more difficulty achieving their
building goals in high growth areas. Antidevelopment groups are usually not very influ-
ential in the slowly developing sections of the country, where the ills of growth are less
evident.
36. Those concerned about potential food shortages should seek to increase housing
density, thereby lessening pressure to convert farmland to urban use.
37. A study of infrastructure costs for 1980 in Westchester County, New York,
shows that as density decreases, these costs dramatically increase:
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IV. THE HOUSTON EXPERIENCE
Houston, Texas is the only major city in the United States that
has never adopted zoning.38 Despite this, it is likely that land uses on
the whole are about as separated in Houston as they would be under
zoning. But even if this is not entirely accurate, it is more than offset
by the economic and social rewards emanating from the absence
of unnecessary government restraints over the development of
property. 9
How has this occurred without zoning controls? The answer is
that Houston does have land use controls, but these are primarily
economic. Specifically, the use and development of land and property
in Houston are controlled in three different ways. First, by the nor-
mal economic forces of the marketplace; second, through legal
agreements, principally restrictive covenants; and third, through a
relatively limited number of land use ordinances adopted by the
city.4 0 Houston also controls development through subdivision, build-
ing, traffic, and housing regulations that do not seem to vary signifi-
cantly from those of other cities in its region. 1 But the contrast with
Cluster
Lot size I acre acre 2 units/acre
Lot width 125 feet 25 feet 35 feet
Infrastructure
Costs $30,125 $18,075 $8,435
Infrastructure costs include costs for streets, curbs, lighting, sidewalks, sanitary sewer
and water lines. URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND ENERGY, INC., THE EFFECTS OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON HOUSING CosTs 71 (1982); REPORT, supra note 7, at 203
(table 15.1), 203 n.20.
38. Houston is the only major city that held straw votes on adopting zoning. In
1948, only property owners were allowed to vote, and the result was 14,142 to 6555
against zoning. In 1962, when there was no such restriction on voting, the vote also went
against zoning, 70,957 to 54,279; approximately 48.5% of those qualified voted. B. SIE-
GAN, supra note 16, at 25. To date, no other vote has been held on this issue. Houstoni-
ans retain, of course, the option to impose zoning if they wish.
39. See generally B. SIEGAN, supra note 16; R. Jones, Houston City Planning
Without Zoning, in M. GOLDBERG & P. HORWOOD, ZONING: ITS COSTS AND RELE-
VANCE FOR THE 1980s (1980).
Jones was formerly Director of City Planning in Houston. In 1981, appearing before a
public hearing of President Reagan's Commission on Housing, Jones said, "Zoning is
archaic. It makes the marketplace respond to outmoded ideas." Carreau, Hearings on
Housing, City planner tells commission "zoning archaic," Houston Post, Dec. 15, 1981
at 5A, col. 1.
40. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 26-27, 30-31.
41. Most cities in the region use either the Southern Standard Building Code or
the Uniform Building Code, with modifications. They both were drafted by private indus-
try organizations. However, Texas law prevents counties from adopting and enforcing
zoning is clear: unless the property is subject to an enforceable re-
strictive covenant (to be discussed later), the city exercises minimum
control over the uses that will be made of that property.
The Houston experience demonstrates that in the United States,
zoning schemes regulating land use separation and yield are not es-
sential to the existence and viability of cities. The real estate market-
place does not operate chaotically or haphazardly. Residential, com-
mercial, and industrial uses tend to develop separately from each
other. Certain uses will develop only in certain places. Gas station
and fast food franchises, and most other major commercial develop-
ments provide an obvious illustration; regardless of where they are
permitted, they will locate only on heavily trafficked streets.42
This means that major business and commercial uses generally
will be absent from the residential or local streets which constitute
close to eighty percent of total street mileage within Houston, and
probably about the same elsewhere. In areas of Houston no longer
subject to restrictive covenants or in which covenants were never im-
posed, these local streets contain relatively few commercial uses,
probably no more than five percent within a specified area. The bulk
of these are home occupations and businesses that serve the residents
of the area, and therefore, contrary to much conventional thinking
on the subject, are probably compatible with the area.43
There is also a great tendency for industrial uses to group and
concentrate separately from residential uses. A comparison of maps
showing the location of industrial uses in the metropolitan area of
Houston with similar maps of Los Angeles or Dallas, cities with
building codes, and city governments' extraterritorial jurisdiction does not include any
power to enforce building codes beyond their city limits. Bjornseth, No-Code Comfort,
REASON, July 1983, at 43, 44.
42. Gas stations and fast food franchises usually are located only on streets with a
heavy traffic count. On the rare occasion when this does not occur, the life of the enter-
prise will be very short.
43. These conclusions are based on surveys made in December 1969 of three sub-
stantial areas of Houston never or no longer restricted: Denver Harbor (950 structures),
Montrose (450 structures), Riverside (240 structures). Denver Harbor was never subject
to restrictive covenants; most covenants in Montrose expired in 1936; and one-half of
Riverside's covenants terminated in 1950. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 36-42; Jones,
supra note 39, at 46-49.
Houston contains a great many areas of single family occupancy that look identical to
zoned areas. There are also mixtures of uses available for those seeking to demonstrate
the ill effects of nonzoning. Frequently, however, the same mixtures exist in cities that
are zoned. See Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. & ECON. 71, 91 n.42 (1970).
Houston's appearance has long been a subject of considerable controversy. For a
favorable view of this aspect of the city, see Huxtable, Houston Is The Future ... ,
Houston Chron., Feb. 22, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 1. The author was then the architecture
critic of the New York Times, and a Pulitzer Prize winner. See also Huxtable, Houston
Will Never Be New York, Houston Chron., Feb. 22, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
Recently, the Population Crisis Center rated Houston as the seventh most livable city
in the world. Study Names World's Best, Worst Cities, San Diego Union, Nov. 20, 1990,
at A2, col. 2.
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which Houston is often compared, suggests that the proliferation of
industry in the Houston area. is probably no greater than in these
other metropolitan areas. There may be even less dispersal, although
the large territories involved and differing definitions of industry
make measurement very difficult. This pattern is generally confirmed
by the land use maps of other nonzoned Texas cities: Pasadena,
Wichita Falls, Laredo, and Baytown.4"
It is generally too costly in terms of land prices and potential resi-
dential hostility for heavy industry to locate near new residential
subdivisions." The plants and factories in the Houston area which
are contiguous to and which were erected subsequent to homes are
usually "light" rather than "heavy" in character. In most instances,
their existence appears to pose no more, and possibly less, peril to
residential values than would be the case if the same property had
been developed for an alternative use such as apartments.
Apartment and condominium development also reflects this pat-
tern of separation. Thus, notwithstanding the absence of location re-
strictions, the vast bulk of multifamily development in Houston has
occurred in the southwest section of the city.
There are substantial areas in and around Houston where there is
minimum demand for multiple family, industrial, and commercial
development. These areas provide the land for single family occu-
pancy. Most single family unit developers in Houston (as well as in
many other parts of the country before the advent of zoning) have
traditionally imposed restrictive covenants to permit only the erec-
tion of houses of specified characteristics within their subdivisions.4"
Because many of the earlier restrictive covenants in Houston were
limited in duration, legally insufficient, ' or not enforced by owners,
zoning would probably have kept more areas as single family.47 As it
happens, zoning would thereby also have impeded the development
of much housing and also nonhousing facilities that has occurred
subsequently within the city.
44. BERNARD JOHNSON ENGINEERS, INC., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE CITY PLAN BAYTOWN, TEXAS 32, pt. 7 (1964); MARMON, MOK & GREEN, INC.,
DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR PASADENA, TEXAS 77 (1967); TEXAS HIGHWAY DEP'T, LAREDO
URBAN TRANSPORTATION STUDY fig. 9 (1964); WICHITA FALLS, TEXAS, URBAN TRANS-
PORTATION PLAN 1964-1985, at fig. 9 (1964).
45. B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 62-65.
46. In contemporary years, regardless of whether zoning exists in the community,
developers of planned unit developments-both detached and attached housing-usually
impose restrictive covenants as a sales device to accommodate the needs and desires of
the residents.
47. B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 33.
Studies of zoning have shown that market mechanisms operate to
reduce the impact of uses that are regarded in zoning theory as ad-
verse to property values .4  This is evident in Houston, where the
price of vacant land depends in part on the actual or potential use of
adjoining land. Thus, land on the perimeter of a residential subdivi-
sion may sell for far less than that located in the interior if the land
adjoining the subdivision is vacant or used for purposes other than
residential development. In a nonzoned market, economic forces op-
erate to internalize many externalities of land development and use.
Most of the covenants created subsequent to World War II are
much more durable, and seem to offer a reasonably practical solu-
tion to the conflicting desires of allowing for change yet maintaining
stability. Most post-World War II covenants contain an automatic
extension provision.49 They provide for an initial duration period of
twenty-five to thirty years, and an indefinite number of ten-year au-
tomatic extension periods: Agreement on the part of fifty-one percent
of the owners (usually one vote per lot or on the basis of frontage)
may cancel or amend the covenants before the end of the initial pe-
riod or before the end of any subsequent ten-year period. Under this
provision, a majority of homeowners can control the destiny of their
subdivision.
Inasmuch as enforcement of restrictive covenants can be costly for
homeowners in lesser income subdivisions and small subdivisions,
Houston adopted an ordinance in 1965 enabling the city to enforce
these covenants.50 Houston has also adopted an offstreet parking or-
dinance for residential development, a limited number of location re-
strictions, and a relatively small number of other government regula-
tions designed to cure problems of land use not satisfactorily
controlled by the private market."'
For homeowners, restrictive covenants serve the same purpose of
48. Crecine, Davis & Jackson, Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results
and Their Implications for Municipal Zoning, 10 J. L. & ECON. 79 (1967); Maser,
Riker & Rosett, The Effects of Zoning and Externalities on the Price of Land: An
Empirical Analysis of Monroe County, New York, 20 J. L. & ECON. 111 (1977);
Rueter, Externalities in Urban Property Markets: An Empirical Test of the Zoning Or-
dinance of Pittsburgh, 16 J. L. & ECON. 313 (1973); Stull, Community Environment,
Zoning and the Market Value of Single Family Homes, 18 J. L. & ECON. 535 (1975).
49. B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 34-35.
50. Susman, Municipal Enforcement of Private Restrictive Covenants: An Innova-
tion in Land Use Control, 44 TEX. L. REv. 741 (1966); Comment, Houston's Invention
of Necessity-An Unconstitutional Substitute in Zoning?, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 307
(1969); Comment, The Municipal Enforcement of Deed Restrictions: An Alternative to
Zoning, 9 Hous. L. RaV. 816 (1972).
51. Ordinances as of 1972 are set forth in B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 26-31, In
recent years, Houston has adopted ordinances prohibiting "undesirable" uses such as sex-
ually oriented businesses, junk yards, and helicopter pads in or near residential areas.
Other of its recent land use ordinances are reported in Houston's Council Tries to Con-
trol City Growth, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at A12, col. 1.
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maintaining exclusivity as does zoning. While similar in this respect,
the covenants otherwise vary greatly from zoning both in application
and operation, and they illustrate the difference between the eco-
nomic and political marketplaces in determining land use and devel-
opment. As heretofore explained, zoning is controlled by the political
system and principally achieves that which is most important politi-
cally. It allows homeowners to influence zoning of land far removed
from their subdivision.
On the other hand, developers or owners and their lenders impose
covenants on their subdivisions solely as a means to secure and maxi-
mize their investments. They will apply covenants in accordance
with what they believe are the desires of their prospective purchas-
ers. Since there is usually no incentive for owners to restrict the use
of their land while it is in a raw state, covenants normally affect
little more than land already developed or programmed for develop-
ment, and then largely for homes or townhouses. As a result, proba-
bly no more than fifteen to twenty percent of the land area of Hous-
ton is subject to restrictive covenants. Under zoning, every square
inch of the city's land would be regulated.
Restrictive covenants are a device of the market to maximize the
value of property. Most American homeowners prefer to live in a
homogeneous environment, and they should have the freedom to pur-
sue this goal, provided others are'not harmed. Restrictive covenants
come close to achieving this balance. By contrast, zoning allows al-
most unlimited pursuit of exclusivity, often with consequent adverse
effects upon many others.
When one wants to quantify the results of zoning, it is useful to
consider the experience of Houston and its environs. By comparing
the Houston area with a similar area that has imposed zoning, the
consequences of the regulation can be estimated. The most obvious
area for comparison is Dallas. Houston and Dallas are approxi-
mately 230 miles apart and share similar economic profiles. 5 Dallas
has been zoned since the early 1930s. The bulk of the Houston Stan-
dard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) is not zoned, while ap-
proximately the reverse situation occurs in the Dallas SMSA. Zon-
ing in Dallas is of relatively moderate character. It is far less severe
52. For comparisons for 1960 to 1970, see B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 100-03.
Generally, similar relationships appear in the 1980 census figures. See U.S. DEP'T Or
COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING (GENERAL SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CHARACTERIS-
TICS-TEXAS) 45-21. One difference is that the median income in 1979 was about 10%
higher in the Houston SMSA than in the Dallas-Fort Worth SMSA. This difference does
not significantly affect any Houston-Dallas comparisons contained in this article.
than the zoning regulations in many of the nation' developing sub-
urbs, including some Houston and Dallas suburbs that have enacted
strict zoning control. The other regulations affecting housing in the
two cities, such as subdivision, building, minimum housing, and traf-
fic regulations, do not appear to differ appreciably. 3
Until the fall of world oil prices in the early 1980s, both areas had
for many years experienced very high housing demand. There is no
evidence that the spectrum of this demand between the two areas
varied significantly. The similarity of income statistics over the years
supports this conclusion.54 However, the supply response in each dif-
fered considerably; the Houston area catered much more to average
and lesser income people by producing a far greater percentage of
multifamily units."5 Land use regulation appears to be the major fac-
tor accounting for this difference, since its presence in Dallas likely
restricted apartment production there.
Statistics on housing starts for comparable portions of both locali-
ties for the periods 1973 to 80, inclusive, show that the Houston area
produced 73 % more starts than the Dallas area. Multifamily starts
were 116% greater and single family starts 36% greater in the
Houston section. 56 This difference in multifamily output probably
accounts for rents in the Houston area being lower in those years
than in Dallas. The most comprehensive rent comparisons for the
two areas are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in its an-
nual estimates of living costs at three income levels for a four-person
family and a retired couple. For the years 1972 to 1979, inclusive,
these estimates show that Houston SMSA rents were the same or
53. In recent years, most building in the Houston area has occurred in the unincor-
porated sections of Harris- County, which has virtually no building regulations. I am
uncertain as to this situation in the Dallas area. The absence of building codes would
operate to reduce costs of construction. Accordingly, the comparisons between Houston
and Dallas are subject to possible modification, depending on how much new construction
has occurred in areas without building codes. Houston's building costs are apparently
higher than those in Dallas. See infra note 57. Due to Houston's favorable attitude to-
ward development, the percentage difference between building costs in the city and
county are probably in the low, single-digit area.
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 56.
56. The comparisons below are between Harris County, which contains Houston,
and the Dallas SMSA. I have used Harris County and not the Houston SMSA for com-
parison because the figures come from the same source as those for Dallas SMSA, and
this source, unlike others, separates townhouses and condominiums, which for purposes of
this analysis, should be regarded as multifamily housing. Harris County's population was
12% less in 1970 and 17% less in 1980 than that of the Houston SMSA. About three-
quarters of the SMSA's housing starts occurred in the county for the period in question.
Siegan, Commentary on Redistribution of Income Through Regulation in Housing, 32
EMORY L.J. 720, 728 n.1 (1983). The portion of the Houston SMSA that is excluded by
using Harris County figures produces probably 50% multifamily housing, and, therefore,
the SMSA would show somewhat less difference from the Dallas SMSA in category of
construction. Multifamily housing includes townhouses (not identified as to rental or
sale) and condominiums.
300
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lower in all categories. Totaling all of these figures on an unweighted
basis, the Dallas SMSA rents were about thirteen percent higher
Multifamily and single family housing starts in
Houston and Dallas areas: 1973-1980
Total Housing Starts
Total multifamily starts
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The above figures are reproduced from Siegan, supra, at 728. Inasmuch as multifamily
housing occupies much less land than single family housing, Houston has used considera-
bly less land for urban purposes than Dallas.
The actual housing productivity of the Houston area may be far greater than the fore-
going figures suggest. According to Chicago Title and Insurance Company Market Re-
search Services, Chicago, Illinois, the Houston SMSA has produced in 1978 to 1981
many more new residential units per 100 existing households than the Dallas-Fort Worth












Figures for 1980 and 1981 are reported in Pfister, The Housing Recession, THE GUAR-
ANTOR, May-June 1982, at 12. Figures for 1978 and 1979 are contained in Chicago Title
Insurance Company Market Research Services, 1980 New Residential Units Per 100
Households Forecast (1980) (on file with author).
than Houston SMSA rents. For the other years for which compara-
ble figures are available for both SMSAs, 1966 to 1969, inclusive,
the difference in rental prices was about fifteen percent."
Support for these findings comes from the Eton Journal surveys of
1979, 1980, and 1981 apartment rentals in the nation's sixteen most
significant real estate markets. For units located in the city, Dallas
rents were fourteen percent higher than Houston's in December
1980, and sixteen percent higher in March 1981. For units identified
as "suburban," Dallas area rents were seventeen percent higher in
December 1980, twenty-five percent higher in March 1981, and
eleven percent higher in May 1981. In January 1979 Dallas rents
were five percent higher in both city and suburban sections, and
twelve percent higher in January 1980.58
Moreover, throughout this period, vacancy rates in Houston ap-
parently were much higher than those in Dallas. According to the
Eton Journal figures, Houston averaged the highest vacancy rate
(six to seven percent) of any city surveyed in both January 1979 and
1980.' 9 This finding is not surprising, since Houston frequently has
had large vacancy rates due to its high productivity.
Comparable price statistics for single family dwellings do not ap-
pear to be available.60 However, housing generally should be much
57. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS BULLETIN, THREE
BUDGETS FOR A FOUR PERSON FAMILY AND FOR AN URBAN RETIRED COUPLE (1972-79
annual eds.). The 1966-69 figures are set forth in B. SIEGAN, supra note 16, at 112.
Boeckh Building costs show that for the sample years of 1970, 1976, and 1980, Hous-
ton construction costs were a little higher than those in Dallas. BOECKH DIVISION, AMER-
ICAN APPRAISAL COMPANY, BOECKH BUILDING COST-INDEX NUMBERS (Jan.-Feb. 1982)
(on file with San Diego Law Review). As of 1980, Houston used the 1970 Uniform
Building Code, and Dallas used the 1979 Uniform Building Code, with each city impos-
ing its own modifications.
58. Siegan, supra note 56, at 729. Notwithstanding these statistics, the 1980 Cen-
sus shows that the median contract rent for Houston SMSA was $256 and for Dallas-
Fort Worth SMSA $239; $258 and $244, respectively, for the urbanized areas. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING (GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERIS-
TICS-TEXAS) 45-9 to 45-10. The evidence that has come to my attention and herein
reported leads me to discount the 1980 Census figures as revealing the actual differences
in rent between the two cities.
59. Siegan, supra note 56, at 729. The 1980 Census shows the rental vacancy rate
for the Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth SMSAs as 14.7% and 10.4% respectively. For
the urbanized areas, the figures were 14.5% and 10.5%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980
CENSUS OF HOUSING (GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS-TEXAS) 45-9 to 45-10.
60. Home prices show a different pattern than apartment rentals. The Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) has published annually prices and other data relative to
sales of existing and new homes that it has insured under its section 203 program. See
FHA, DATA FOR STATES AND SELECTED AREAS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF FHA OPERA-
TIONS UNDER SEC. 203 (1960-74 annual eds.). This program principally involves the
most inexpensive, nonsubsidized housing available in the market. According to these
surveys, from 1960 through 1974, there was often little difference in actual prices (taking
into account construction, square footage, and amenities) of existing or new FHA insured
homes between the Houston and Dallas SMSAs. For most of this period, Houston's
prices were lower, although in some years they were noticeably higher. Beginning in
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cheaper in the absence of regulation. The Report of President Rea-
gan's Housing Commission concludes that unnecessary zoning and
related requirements may often elevate the price of housing by
twenty-five percent or more."
1975, FHA changed the measurement area from Dallas SMSA to Dallas-Fort Wort
SMSA, of which Dallas is a much smaller component, limiting the relevance of this
information. See Siegan, supra note 56, at 729-30. Thus, the population of Dallas in
1980 was 904,078, while that of the Dallas SMSA was then 1,949,000, and that of the
Dallas-Fort Worth SMSA was 2,960,000. For that year, Houston's population was
1,594,086, and that of the Houston SMSA was 2,887,000. Siegan, supra note 56, at 730
n.1l.
I am aware of only one study concerning residential price differences in Dallas and
Houston. Professor Richard Peiser observed that when similar houses in equivalent loca-
tions were compared, prices were about $4000 to $10,000 less expensive in Houston. He
attributes this difference largely to the higher price of land in Dallas, brought about by
zoning and other regulations in that city. Peiser, Lot Costs Compared in Dallas and
Houston, 18 TIERRA GRANDE 30 (1982).
A study by the Urban Land Institute to determine land prices and rates of their in-
crease between 1975 and 1980 for 30 SMSAs showed the following prices and percent-
age increases for Dallas and Houston SMSAs:
Improved Lot Raw Acreage
5yr. % 5yr. %
SMSA 1980 1975 increase 1980 1975 increase
Dallas $16,000 $9,500 68.4 $20,500 $8,500. 141.2
Houston $12,000 $7,850 53.8 $10,000 $7,004 42.8
Dunau, Working Paper on Land Price Levels and Rates of Increase, (Urban Land Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C. 1981).
61. REPORT, supra note 7, at 180.
Economics professors Lloyd Mercer and W. Douglas Morgan conducted a study of
Santa Barbara County Housing and found that development restrictions accounted for
more than 27% of the increase in real housing prices during the 1972 to 1979 period.
Mercer & Morgan, An Estimate of Residential Growth Controls Impact on Housing
Prices, in RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS, supra note 31, at 189.
L. Sogalyn and C. Sternleib studied certain zoning and building requirements in New
Jersey. These authors concluded that reducing three major zoning requirements (lot size,
lot frontage, and living area) would reduce prices considerably and enlarge the effective
housing market. Changing two building code specifications (thickness of exterior wall
sheeting and size of foundation cinderblock) would also lower selling prices, but not to
the same degree as would altering zoning policies. See L. SOGALYN & C. STERNLIEB,
ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS: THE IMPACT OF LAND USE CONTROLS ON HOUSING
PRICE (1972).
To determine the impact of local government regulation on the cost of housing, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development initiated a Housing Cost Reduction
Demonstration project in 1980. Four communities across the country were selected to
participate in the project, which used reduced local government regulations as the only
variable. In these communities, zoning, building, and subdivision regulations were lim-
ited. In the initial projects for which early figures were available, the prices of homes
were reduced by 21% to 33 %. In Shreveport, Louisiana, demonstration housing units
had sales prices of $52,850, while homes in a comparable suburban project with conven-
tional regulations and processing sold for $70,000. In Hayward, California, the demon-
In addition, zoning rules have prohibited the construction of many
low cost accommodations. Again, Houston provides an interesting
example. The city has no density controls, and in the late 1960s,
rental projects were built in minority neighborhoods containing six-
teen or more detached houses per acre, an unusually high concentra-
tion by prevailing standards.62 This density was even too much for
Houston's planning department, which sought unsuccessfully to ban
them.
The developments in question were being erected in very low in-
come, black areas by private, unsubsidized investors, a rare occur-
rence in the United States. The principal inducement for the devel-
opers was the opportunity afforded by the large density to reduce
land and construction costs. These projects offer unusually inexpen-
sive rental housing, in all likelihood superior to that which the te-
nants last occupied.
Because Houston imposes no restriction as to size and type of con-
struction, the market for new houses is very flexible. As mortgage
rates rise, for example, the developer is able to reduce the size of
units to limit prices. In many suburbs of Dallas, on the other hand,
where zoning regulates dwelling unit size and type, it is not possible
to construct units below a specified square footage. A Texas devel-
oper testified before the Reagan housing commission that, as a re-
sult, he had to discontinue building in these suburbs, denying many
potential consumers an opportunity to purchase housing.63
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Critics of Houston's land use system contend that as a result of it,
the city is not very pleasing aesthetically. Beauty being in the eye of
the beholder, it is not difficult to find others who disagree and con-
sider the city quite attractive. However, the use of land should not be
judged by this or any other single factor. If aesthetics were to be the
major concern, the tightly zoned, strongly exclusionary suburbs
would be the ideal. The issue is instead to determine the land use
system that bests serves society, an inquiry that involves the exten-
sive analysis seen in this article.
One virtue of the Houston system that has been previously re-
ferred to is worthy of some additional observations. The absence of
regulation in that city affords great opportunity for builders and de-
stration units ranged in price from $53,000 to $65,000. Comparable units subject to con-
ventional regulation in the area sold for $79,500 to $97,500. In all instances, the builders
sought to obtain a normal profit margin. Bjornseth, supra note 41, at 44.
62. At the time, single-family detached units typically ranged in density in the
United States between one and five units per acre. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (1974).
63. REPORT, supra note 7, at 204.
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velopers to satisfy consumer demand. Human resourcefulness and in-
ventiveness are able to thrive in Houston because of the absence of
their enemy, government regulation. Unfortunately, in zoned cities,
these talents are often spent in persuading or outmaneuvering the
zoning authorities.
The communist collapse reveals how debilitating government regu-
lation is to human creativity, ingenuity, and productivity. The com-
munist rulers sought to regulate almost every human activity to
achieve the common good; instead of producing a paradise, however,
they created virtual prisons. These prisons did not necessarily confine
physical bodies, but they did incarcerate the human mind.
VI. CONCLUSION
Is the Houston system of land use applicable elsewhere? Is
nonzoning feasible and desirable for, say, areas where land is much
more scarce? In answering this inquiry, consider the fate of the last
forty acres that remain vacant in a zoned community where all other
land has been fully developed. Assume its zoning has not been final-
ized; that is, it is in a holding classification. The decision as to how
this last tract of vacant land will be used in a zoned city will be
made through the planning and political processes of local
government.
The city council or other governing board will zone or rezone the
property after hearing from all of the interested parties, their plan-
ners, lawyers, and other representatives. These include the owner,
the neighbors, the local civic or homeowners groups, political organi-
zations, the school and park boards, perhaps the Chamber of Com-
merce, labor groups, and, of course, assorted do-gooders and do-bad-
ders. Almost everyone except those who will directly benefit from the
development, such as potential homeowners, tenants, and shoppers,
can be expected to enter the fray. Each side will have little difficulty
in producing a planner to prove "conclusively" that its position is the
only correct one.
How it will come out will depend on who or what is best able to
influence, pressure, or even pay for the vote of the city council mem-
bers. That there may be an enormous demand for apartments in the
community is likely to be a less important factor than the opposition
to such use by certain politicians, by a homeowner or civic group, or
by the media.
By contrast, the answer where there is no zoning is relatively
clear. The property will in all likelihood be developed for the most
valuable use, the one that society values the greatest. 4 The land will
thereby satisfy the predominant consumer demand. Thus, as the
Houston and Dallas comparisons reveal, a high demand for apart-
ments is much more likely to be satisfied in the absence of zoning
than in the presence of zoning.
This is, I submit, the most socially rewarding use of the property
as determined by the least fallible of city planners, the marketplace.
It will provide more material and environmental benefits for more
people, both those who benefit directly and those who benefit indi-
rectly from the project. It will make for a more efficient allocation of
resources within the community. And precious land will be used to
provide for the needs and desires of human beings, and will not be
wasted for the sake of political expediency and planners'
speculations.65
64. This example assumes, of course, that the city will still exercise controls under
the vital and pressing standard previously discussed. See supra text accompanying notes
10-I1.
If the 40 acre tract in question is in a zoned area, the owners of adjoining and nearby
property presumably relied on the zoning ordinance in acquiring their property. Their
investment expectations should be supported. Consider in this respect, the following rec-
ommendation of Reagan's Housing Commission:
A possible problem of deregulation [of zoning] is that it may adversely affect
those who in good faith made their purchase or investments in reliance on the
old rules [the prior zoning ordinance]. A change to the proposed "vital and
pressing" standard would pose such a problem. Persons who purchase a home
or a lot for construction of a home near vacant land assume that it will not be
arbitrarily reclassified to allow other uses. The reasonable investment expecta-
tions of these homeowners should be protected. When vacant land is proposed
for a use that would have required rezoning, homeowners entitled to notice
under the old rules should be protected under the requirements and procedures
of the old rules.
REPORT, supra note 7, at 201.
65. One likely result of political expediency and planners' speculations would be a
limitation of supply as explained in this interesting observation on planning and regula-
tion by a Soviet economist:
[Plans] are like idols to which everybody is bowing due to some mesmerizing
force. . . . What we call planning, in real life is more often than not only the
regulation of the economic processes which are developing as if of their own
accord, beyond society's conscious control. This is the only explanation for the
fact that planning often coexists with the existence of chronic scarcity of
commodities. . ..
Oleg Bogomolov (academician, director, Institute of Economics of the World Socialist
Systems), Planning, Moscow News, No. 29, 1987, at 9, col. 3.
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Addendum
In April 1990, the author was a member of a ten-person team
appointed by the American Institute of Architects to study and
make recommendations regarding future land use planning and reg-
ulation in Houston. The formation of the team was prompted by
some public demands that the city adopt zoning. The team recom-
mended that the city establish "a process for city coordination of
metropolitan systems (transport, utilities, open space/environmen-
tally sensitive areas) and capital improvement programs and imple-
ment a comprehensive planning process at the 'Sector' scale with
land use regulation determined by the sector." The team did not rec-
ommend the adoption of any specific regulatory techniques.
In its inquiry as to existing land use regulation, the team heard
testimony that the city was not adequately enforcing existing restric-
tive covenants. It is apparent that fears exist in the community that
residential neighborhoods are not being adequately protected from
adverse uses. The team urged the city to substantially increase staff-
ing and enforcement in this area. To further protect residential
neighborhoods, the team also recommended that the list of uses pro-
hibited within or certain distances from residential areas be
increased.'
1. See HOUSTON R/UDAT TASK FORCE REPORT (Apr. 20-23, 1990).

